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THE CAUSES OF FAILURE OF OLYMPIC AIRWAYS’ S RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS
APPLIED BY THE GREEK STATE
John S. Lainos Ph.D., Air Transport Economics-Management
Aircraft Technology Department. Technological Educational Institution of Chalkis-Greece
Olympic Airways (O.A.), the former Greek flag carrier, was nationalized in 1975. For the period 1975-1994 its
cumulative deficits had mounted to 455 billion GRD, (1.63 billion US$).  However, at the same time all
governments enforced on O.A. the implementation of their various policies, always at the company’s expense.
The state debts to O.A.- due to the aforementioned reason were in 1993 (E.U. involvement) almost three times
higher than O.A.’s operational deficits. These state debts have not been permitted to O.A. to register in their
accounting books.  Since 1993 the Greek state, O.A.’s exclusive shareholder, has attempted to introduce
changes which were considered to be appropriate in order for O.A.’s crisis to be overcome, by passing two
laws;  one  in  1994  and  a  supplementary  one  in  1998.  These  efforts,  as  well  as  the  five  efforts  for  O.A.’s
privatization which followed, have failed to date.
Keywords: Airline-changes-introduction, Airline-crisis-methodological-approach, Airline-crisis-symptoms-
causes, Airline-economics, Airline-management, Airline-restructure-measures-methods, Airline-State-aid,
Airline-State-ownership, Olympic-Airways.
The aim of the present paper
is the determination of the causes which have led to failure of the Greek government’s efforts as O.A.’s
exclusive shareholder to introduce appropriate changes for overcoming the crisis.
The contribution of the author is:
1) the determination of the causes due to which the Greek government’s  efforts of O. A. restructuring have
 been inefficient
2) the proposal regarding the general steps which must be followed for effective introduction of
 changes in an organisation
3) the implemented methodology (analysis and synthesis) which distinguishes the symptoms from the
 causes of the crisis manifestation in O.A., focusing on the primary causes. This methodology can
 be implemented efficiently to any similar case.
Introduction
The efficient introduction of changes in an
organization is essential in order for its operation to
be compatible to the alterations in its internal and
external environment. There is no specific
international formula of introdu- cing changes,
according to which procedures, methods,
mechanisms or measures could be decided and
effectively employed. This is due to the diverse
factors which differentiate the measures and the
methods needed for each organization and the high
complexity of the implementation process due
mainly to the differentiation of cultures (Burnes,
1996, 2000, Kotter 1995; Lainos 2001 Lewin 1947;
Petti- grew 1985; Pettigrew & Whipp 1991, 1993;).
The case study of the Greek state’s efforts 1994-
2003 to restructure Olympic Airways
The Greek flag carrier Olympic Airways (O.A.)
was nationalized in 1975, because its former
owner, Onassis, demanded a state subsi dization of
60 mil.  US $  for  the  year  1975.  In  the  same year,
the government acquired the airline by paying 69
mil. US $. (Lainos 1992) O.A.’s cumulative
deficits since its nationalization up to 1994 have
reached 455 billion GRD, (1.63 billion
US$).(Lainos 2001).
Since the implementation of any recovery program
required state aid which is not authorized by the
E.U., the Greek Government in 1993 conducted the
first program for O.A.’s restructuring in
collaboration with the private consultant
“AVMARK”. That program was submitted to the
E.U. but it was rejected due to its low reliability
standard. (E.U.1994). The second recovery program
was conducted by the then newly elected Greek
Government (1993-10) in collaboration with the
aforementioned consultant. .(E.U. 1994). Then
Olympic Airways’ B.O.D. assigned to the author the
conduction of a research-study regarding the debts
of the state-shareholder to O.A. (TABLE 1)
according to the E.U. Commissioner’s requirements.
These  debts  had  been  the  result  of  the  Greek  state
implementation on the O.A. of the various policies
mentioned below at the company’s expense. These
debts have not  been permitted to O.A. to register in
their accounting books.  (Lainos 2006)
358
TABLE 1
1. Non deposit of the share capital
2. Discounts offered to certain passenger groups in the domestic network due to obligatory application of
the governmental policy
3. Burdening the O.A.’s economics with the cost of Prime Ministerial and Presidential air travels by
enforcing the governmental policy
4. Unpaid debts of Ministries and other state services from ticket fees for public servants official flights
5. 97% discount on the fares of the daily and weekly press, transported daily by O.A. in obligatory
 application of governmental policy
6. Under-pricing of passenger fares in domestic flights in obligatory application of governmental policy
resulting to violation of the 11th article of O.A.-State convention
7. Refusal of the Greek Civil Aviation Authorities to pay some conventional fees to Olympic Airways.
8. Strains on O.A. due to the debts of political parties offering their voters free air transport during election
periods
9. The cost of the compulsory covering of the loss making domestic itineraries with small frontier airports
(Public Service Obligation according to the E.U.’s legislation)
10. Obligatory annual subsidization of the affiliated companies by O. A.
11. Inclusion in O.A.’s payroll of about one hundred O.A.’s employees appointed to the offices of various
politicians
12. Loss of O.A.’s annual revenue from the interest of the aforementioned state debts
It must be pointed out that the operational
convention of Olympic Airways which was signed
in 1956 between Onassis and the Greek state which
became state law, mentioned that the state was
compelled to cover the aforementioned costs.
Onassis, during his ownership regime used to force
the state fulfill its conventional obligations.
However, since O.A..’s nationalization in 1975 the
state-shareholder ceased fulfilling its conventional
obligations to O.A.
The results of this study prove that the cumulative
(1975-1992) debts of the state-shareholder to O.A.
had been almost three times higher than its
operational deficits.
The same rapport between state debts and O.A.’s
operational deficits remained in 1994 as well.
A great part of the aforementioned results of our
research-study (state debts to the O.A.) has been
included in the restructuring program which the
Greek  state  submitted  to  the  E.U.  on  20th  May
1994. This program was approved by the E.U. in
October 1994 and it was transformed by the Greek
parliament into state law 2271/1994-12-23 with
validity from the 1997-12-31 on.
The majority of the employees (more than 80%),
supported via their unions this program, which
required, inter alia, deterioration of the terms and
conditions of their labor (reduction in their salaries etc)
During O.A.’s first recovery period (1994-1997)
none of the administrational measures which had
been included in the law was applied. However, a
great part of the measures resulting in deterioration
of the working terms and conditions was fulfilled.
When, on the expiring date of the aforementioned
law, the board of directors and the Greek
Government realized that they had  failed to
implement the measures towards overcoming
O.A.’s crisis, a new law 2602/ 1998-4-13 was
passed with complementary recovery measures and
with expiring date 2001-12-31.
The majority of the employees (more than 65%)
after their negative experience from the application
of the first restructuring program (worsening their
labor terms and conditions without application of
recovery measures) rejected the application of the
second one and went on strike.
Six months after law 2602/1998 with expiring date
the 2001-12-31 had been enacted, the Greek
government announced their decision to privatize
O.A. (firstly its management and subsequently the
majority of its share capital).
After five unsuccessful attempts of the Greek
governments for O.A.’s  privatize- tion, the Greek
flag carrier was liable to prose- cution by the
European Committee (2003/4, 2003/5, 2006/10) in
the European Court for 540 million euros illegal
state subsidization. Questions arose for the
intentions of the E.U., because, since 1994 they
had been aware of the huge debts of the Greek state
to O.A. with no intention of taking any legal
actions against the Greek state enforcing the
debts repayment.
The E. U. relegated Greece to the European Court
in 2003 based on the imprecise statement of the
Greek Minister of Transport that the Greek state
owed to OA the amount of 43,5 million euros,
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while the E. U.  claimed that OA had been illegally
subsidized by the state, with  161 million euros.
In February 2003 the Greek govern- ment decided
to dichotomize O.A. in two companies : Olympic
Airlines which included only the flight operations
and Olympic Airways-Services. This
dichotomization was completed in December 2003.
In their letter to the E.U. the Greek government
presented potential facilitation of the company’s
privatization as the reason for O.A.’s
dichotomization. When addressing the Greek press
at the same time, they stated that the reason for
dichotomization was the facilitation of O.A.’s
recovery.
On 3rd July 2005, the Greek government, (elected in
April  2004)  with  a  letter  to  the  E.U.  promised  to
cease the operation of Olympic Airways and its
affiliated Olympic Aviation.
In September 2005 after the failure of another two
attempts of O.A.’s privatization the shareholder
announced (Greek Prime Minister 2005) that the
government had decided that O.A. had to cease
operation within the following two months (end of
October 2005) because O.A.’s operation has been a
burden to Greek taxpayers. The day after the Greek
Prime Minister had announced his decision for
O.A.’s operation recess, the B.O.D. of the Aegean
Airlines - O.A.’s sole private domestic competitor -
announced that they had ordered 12 Airbus-320
aircrafts, eight confirmed and four optional.
The statement of the Prime Minister in September
2005 regarding the cease of O.A.’s operation, was
followed by a wide media campaign (in which the
author contributed decisively) in order to inform
society that O.A.’s real financial position was not
loss making - as it appeared to be according to its
accounting books - but profitable as our 1994 study
had proved and as the O.A.’s B.O.D. and the state-
shareholder have already accepted since then.
It is underlined that after 1994 ( first year of
application of O.A.’s restructuring program) until
today, the state has never stopped burdening
O.A.’s operating cost with the cost of the
obligatory fulfillment of the various governmental
policies, although this has been  prohibited by the
E.U. The majority of these new state debts is still
not registered in O.A.’s accounting books. In 2006
the rapport between O.A.’s cumulative deficits and
the states debts has been increased to one tenth.
The aforementioned campaign towards informing
public opinion with regard to the profitable O.A
operation resulted in the
negative reaction of  a 73% of the population
against O.A.’s cease of operation.
On  3rd October 2005 the vice president of
Lufthansa - ally of Aegean Airli- nes - stated that
after O.A.’s cease of operation its Greek domestic
routes will be served by Aegean Airlines while the
international ones will be covered by Lufthansa.
Besides the social reactions, the Greek government
on 22nd November 2005 enacted a law according
to which the “PANTHEON”, a new air-carrier,
would substitute O.A. services up to May 2006
after the latter had ceased operation.
The  establishment  of  “PANTHEON”  and  O.A.’s
cease of operation were never materialized.
On the other hand, between Decem- ber 2005 and
March 2006, for the first time in OA’s history,
O.A-Services B.O.D. prosecuted its exclusive
shareholder the Greek state, in the Supreme Court,
demanding the return of almost a billion Euros
from these debts.
In September 2006 the shareholder (Greek Prime
Minister 2006) announced his decision regarding
the extension of O.A.’s operation at least for two
more years.
The inconstancy of the Greek government
regarding its vision about the prospects of O.A. is
obvious.
We consider that this inconstancy is not due to
incapability of the governmental dignitaries but it
is an expression of an internal governmental
struggle regarding the prospects of O.A., which
were:
a) immediate cease of O.A.’s operation on the
benefit of its sole domestic private competitor
Aegean Airways and its Giga European ally
Lufthansa.
b) escalated privatization to be maintained at
least a typical competition
On October 18th 2006, the European Committee
impeached Greece to the European Court on the
grounds of illegal state subsidisation to O.A. of up
to 540 million euros.  However on 2006-12-21 the
minister of transport announced that O.A.’s
exclusive shareholder, meaning the Greek state,
had been sentenced by the Supreme Court to return
to  O.A.  only  a  part  of  its  debts  to  the  company
reaching the amount of 586 mil Euros,  while there
have been legal demands of O.A. against the Greek
state amounting to  340 million euros. Further more
the minister encouraged the B.O.D. of the airline to
prosecute its exclusive shareholder the Greek state,
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to the Supreme Court, demanding to return a
greater part of its debts.
Corresponding to this encouragement the B.O.D. of
Olympic Airlines announced in January 26 2007
that it had prosecuted its exclusive shareholder the
Greek state, in the Court, demanding the return of
the amount of 340 millions Euros from its debts.
It must be emphasized that both the Greek Prime
Minister and the leader of the major opposition had
stated that the two main reasons for the
manifestation of the crisis in O.A. are wrong
political decisions and mismanagement by O.A.’s
B.O.D. and hierarchy members. However, no
politician has resigned due to the aforementioned
wrong political decisions and none has accused any
members of the O.A.’s B.O.D. to date.
Conclusions
1) Taking into account the E.U.'s legislation
which prohibits illegal state aid, the Greek
Government was not obliged to involve the
E.U. in O.A.’s restructure since O.A. was
actually profitable and not loss making as it
appeared to be in its balance sheets.
2) The profitable financial position comes, from
the co-calculation of the debt of the State
shareholder to O.A., due to the free of charge
obligatory implementation of the various
governmental policies. The Greek state never
returned  its  debts  to  O.A..   Further  more  the
registration in the O.A.’s accounting books, of
these state debts was not permitted. These facts
may lead one to the conclusion that the state-
shareholder had deliberately oriented O.A.’s
operation into loss making. This is the cause of
the false impression that the O.A. was
considered to be under bankruptcy.
3) Consequently the financing of the O.A.’s
restructuring program (overcoming the
administrational malfunctions, rationalisation
of its fleet composition e.t.c.) did not need state
aid as the government had argued. The return
of  only  a  part  of  the  huge  state  debts  to  O.A.
was enough.
4) The only rational explanation regarding the
involvement of the E.U. by the Greek
government, in O.A.’s restructuring may be
considered to be its pursuit to avoid burdening
the political cost caused by the implementation
of unpopular measures essential to achieve its
hidden vision for O.A.’s privatization.
5) The reason why the E.U agreed to participate
in this manipulation, although they knew from
the beginning (recovery program submitted by
the  Greek  state  in  May  1994)   that  O.A.  was
not loss making, is considered to be its policy
which aims at the deduction of the total
number of the E.U.’s air-carriers from 27 to
three, maximum five.
6) The introduction of appropriate changes in
O.A.’s internal environment for its restru-
cturing failed due to the following reasons:
a) The perspective-vision, had not been
clear
b) from the start (restructure and
development
c) under the current state ownership
regime or privatization).
d) Those who were appointed and
involved in the analysis of the O.A.
crisis (the hierarchy and the private
consultant) not only did they fail to
distinguish the causes from the
symptoms of the crisis manife- station,
but they registered and presented them
with an almost equal special weight.
Consequently, due to this reason the
measures for overcoming the causes and
the symptoms had been ineffective
e) The implementation of the laws for
O.A.’s restructuring was assigned to the
same members of the O.A. hierarchy,
who were responsible for the O.A.’s
crisis manifestation.
f) The government, the O.A.’s B.O.D. and
its hierarchy members due to their unre-
liability, failed to persuade the
employees for the necessity to introduce
specific changes in the specific period
of time.
g) Those who were appointed and
involved in the preparation of the field
for the effective introduction of the
changes, failed to make the employees
to participate in the process and to avoid
reactions, although they were in alliance
with the union leaders.
h) This occurred because, instead of
building trust and confidence among the
employees relevant to the goals of the
changes and the prospects of the
company, those who were authorized
and involved in the introduction of
changes (B.O.D. and members of
hierarchy), created among the
employees conditions of uncertainty
and lack of trust and confidence in their
future vision for the O.A.
i) The  B.O.D.  avoided  to  discuss  with
employees and explain to them: 1) what
the problems that the company faced
were 2) the short and long term effects
of these problems on the viability of
their positions  and finally on the
survival of the company.
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j) Nobody called the employees to submit
their proposals concerning the causes of
the crisis and the efficient solutions.
k) The “negotiations with the employees”
were deteriorated by the B.O.D. to
discussions with the leadership of the
Federation and the unions. However,
they had not unified considerations
relevant to the O.A.’s restructure.
Further more those who agreed with the
government had not the expected
influence on the medium level and base
members of the unions.
l) None of the members of O.A.’s B.O.D.
or hierarchy’s were prosecuted for their
failure to apply the two laws for the
O.A.’s restructuring
7) In its letter to the E.U. the Greek government
presented as the reason for O.A.’s
dichotomization the facilitation of its private-
zation  when,  at  the  same  time,  they  stated  to
the Greek press that the reason for dichotomy-
zation was the facilitation of  O.A.’s recovery.
8) The cause of this manipulation as well as the
continuous change, from 2004 to 2006,  of the
state-shareholder’s vision regarding the future
of O.A., is considered to be an attempt of the
Greek government to avoid the political cost
from  its  firm  decision  towards  O.A.’s
privatization, since the 73% of the Greek
population opposed to this prospect.
9) Finally it was not any failure of the Greek
government to introduce into the O.A.’s
internal environment the proper changes
towards its recovery and competitive
development under state ownership regime.
The following facts stand as testimony to the
above mentioned assessment:
a) The former Prime Minister (1990-1993)
stated in 1991 that Greece could
manage without the flag carrier
Olympic Airways.
b) On 12th April 2002 during a debate
among the members of the “Economic
and Transparency Committee” of the
Greek parlia- ment, concerning the
results of the O.A.’s re- structuring, the
minister of Transports (politi- cal
supervisor  of  the  O.A.)  stated  that  the
permanent vision of the government
since 1994 had been the O.A.’s
privatization. But as the circumstances
had not been the desired ones, and the
employees might stimulate nega- tive
reactions, this vision could not be
commu- nicated earlier. This is the
reason, he stated, why sometimes the
politicians are obliged to present a
situation in two different versions. One
version is presented to the members of
the parliament and the other version is
presented during negotiations with the
employees.
Proposals
Based on the international literature (Burnes, B.
2000, Clarke Liz  1994, Harvard Business Review
1998, Kotter J. 1995, Mabey C- Mayon- White B.
1993, Senge P-Kleiner A., Ross R Roberts C. Smith
B Roth G 1999, Senior B. 1997) and according to our
more than ten years experience in O.A.’s
restructuring efforts,  we have conceived a specific
number of steps concerning the efficient introduction
of changes, which must be applied in the order
specified: (TABLE 2)
Table 2. General stages for effective introduction of changes in an air-carrier
A) Determination of the strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
B) Determination and assessment of the current status of the air-carrier
 1) Determination of the negative symptoms.
 2) Determination of the causes of these symptoms
 3) Determination of the sources of the aforementioned causes
C) Research and determination of the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the
strategic and tactic goals of the air-carrier
D) Suitable preparation of the members of hierarchy as well as of the employees
 1) Building trust-certainty-confidence among the employees for the future goals-intentions of the
 company
 2) Informing the employees of the existing problem(s)
 3) Focusing on the current and the long-term negative effects of the existing problem(s) on the
 company’s survival
 4) Focusing on the negative future effects on particular categories of employees and if possible on
 individuals. The success of the aforementioned process relies on the acceptance by employees of
 the certain problem(s) existence
 5) Persuading the employees that some changes are necessary to be introduced in order to resolve the
 problem(s).
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 6) Inviting the employees to submit suggestions and opinions about the necessary changes that
 should be introduced.
 7) Informing the employees about the effects of their suggestions concerning the solution of the
 problems that the company faces.
 8) Starting discussions with the employees to conclude to mutually accepted suggestions concerning:
     a) The number of changes, the field and the time of their implementation
    b)  The role of different categories of employees in the efficient implementation of these
  changes. The discussions concerning all steps of the process should be constant.
E) Co-decision concerning the necessary changes that must be introduced according to the strategic and
tactic goals of the higher ranks of the airline’s management. It is obvious that alliances of the
company’s leader(s) with the official union leadership, together with the unofficial one, facilitate the
successful introduction of changes significantly.
F) Scheduling the introduction of the selected changes (what, when, where, how).
G) Implementation of the introduction of selected changes (fulfillment of all the agreements between
management and employees, determining the individual role of every employee).  The methods that
must be implemented should depend on factors such as:
 1) emergency situation or not (time pressure)
2) existence of relevant institutional framework
3) existence of national and corporate culture
4) employees reactions and attitude
H) Continuous supervision-control of the implementation of the introduced changes (giving priority to
individual self-control) and its effects, in every stage of the process and in every organizational level
and unit.
I) Assessment of the results of the introduced changes.
J) Stabilization of the introduced changes and of their results.
K) In case of failure a new effort should be attempted as soon as the mistakes of the previous effort are
determined and the general circumstances are appropriate.
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